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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, : Case No. 20000884-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Defendant/Appellant Manuel Ernesto Samora 
("Appellant" or "Samora") and entered judgment of conviction for attempted joyriding 
with intent to temporarily deprive the owner, a class A misdemeanor (R. 42). A copy of 
the Judgment is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEWS. PRESERVATION 
Issue 1. Whether the trial judge violated due process, Appellant's right to appear 
and defend, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when he sentenced Appellant in absentia to the 
maximum sentence without affording defense counsel or the state an opportunity to speak 
at sentencing. 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether 
defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). In addition, the 
ultimate issue as to whether Appellant voluntarily absented himself from sentencing is 
reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App. 
1996) (reviewing ultimate issue of whether consent to search was voluntary for 
correctness). While a trial judge ordinarily has discretion in sentencing, such discretion is 
not unlimited. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (recognizing trial 
court exceeds its discretion when it fails to sentence based on reliable and relevant 
information, and reviewing question of whether trial judge sentenced defendant based on 
reliable and relevant information as a question of law). Any underlying factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error. See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) 
(factual findings are reviewed for clear error). 
Preservation. Although defense counsel was not given an opportunity to speak, the 
trial court nevertheless considered the issue of whether it was appropriate to proceed, and 
concluded that Appellant had voluntarily absented himself (R. 64:2). A copy of the 
sentencing transcript is in Addendum B. The trial court also entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, a copy of which is in Addendum C (R. 44-45). In fact, although the 
parties were never given the opportunity to address the issue of whether proceeding in 
absentia was appropriate under the circumstances of the case, the prosecutor was able to 
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prepare findings and conclusions on that issue (R. 64:2). Because the trial court 
considered this issue below, it is properly preserved for appellate review. See State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989) (purpose of requiring that an issue be raised in the 
trial court is to allow the trial judge to review the issue and correct an error).1 
Alternatively, the trial judge committed plain error in proceeding in absentia and in 
failing to base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information without 
affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071; Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22; State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (plain error occurs 
when an error is obvious and prejudices the defendant). Under Johnson and Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(a), the error in failing to conduct a full sentencing hearing was obvious as 
was the denial of Samora's right to presence at sentencing pursuant to Article I, 
section 12, Utah Constitution. The obvious error prejudiced Samora since he received the 
maximum sentence when he otherwise was a candidate for probation; see discussion infra 
at 11. 
1
 The purposes of the preservation rules are to: (1) allow trial counsel the 
opportunity to review and correct any errors, and (2) preclude defense counsel from 
foregoing objections as a matter of strategy and when the strategy does not work and 
defendant is convicted, claiming error. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36; State v. Labrum. 925 
P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
497 U.S. 1024 (1990). In this case where the trial judge reviewed the issue of whether to 
proceed in absentia at sentencing and entered findings and conclusions on that issue, both 
of those purposes were met. The trial court had the opportunity to review the issue and 
correct the error, and no possible trial strategy existed for foregoing the objection. 
Accordingly, the issue was properly preserved for appeal. 
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Finally, the issue should also be reviewed because exceptional circumstances 
justifying review exist in this case. See State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996). 
Utah R. Evid. 22(a) requires a trial judge to afford defendant the opportunity to provide 
relevant information at sentencing; due process requires the judge to conduct a full and 
fair sentencing hearing. Where the judge does not afford counsel the opportunity to speak 
and does not conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing, a procedural anomaly requiring 
review exists. See id. (exceptional circumstances doctrine generally applies to rare 
procedural anomalies). In addition, the question of whether the trial judge imposed legal 
sentence is of widespread interest as evidenced by the number of cases before this Court 
raising a similar issue. Id. (doctrine of exceptional circumstances may be applied where 
"matters of extraordinary importance or widespread interest" exist). Without appellate 
review, the egregious violation of due process, Utah R. Crim. P. 22 and the right to 
presence which occurred in this case would go unchecked. In this case where the trial 
judge had the obligation to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing and failed to do so, 
exceptional circumstances require that this Court review the issue on appeal. 
Issue 2. Whether Appellant waived his right to appeal by failing to appear at 
sentencing. 
Preservation. The state raised this issue in its response to this Court's sua sponte 
motion for summary disposition. This Court ordered that this issue be considered as part 
of the plenary review of this case. See Addendum D. 
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Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law. See generally 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 (questions of law are reviewed for correctness). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following rules and constitutional provision is in Addendum E: 
Utah R.Crim. 17(a)(2); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12; 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 18, 2000, the state charged Samora with unlawful control of a motor 
vehicle, a third degree felony (R. 07). On August 8, 2000, Samora pled guilty to 
attempted unlawful control of a motor vehicle with intent to temporarily deprive, a 
class A misdemeanor, before the Honorable Robin Reese (R. 63). Judge Reese scheduled 
sentencing for September 22, 2000 before the Honorable J. Frederick Dennis (R. 63:8). 
When Samora failed to appear at sentencing on September 22, 2000, Judge Frederick 
sentenced him to the maximum one year sentence (R. 64). This appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Samora was charged with taking his girlfriend's car on March 31, 2000 (R. 07, 
21). According to the plea affidavit, Samora had been living with his girlfriend for over 
three years when he took the car, and did not intend to permanently deprive her of the 
vehicle (R. 21). 
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At the plea colloquy, Samora indicated that his former girlfriend, Kelly Johnson, 
was still using Samora's cell phone and had other property belonging to Samora 
(R. 63:6-7). The record also shows that Samora had worked full time at the same job for 
a year (R. 10). 
After Samora pled guilty, the state requested a presentence report (R. 63:5). On 
September 18, 2000, Judge Frederick revoked Samora's release because he had not 
appeared at Adult Probation and Parole for preparation of a presentence report (R. 35). 
On September 22, 2000, Samora did not appear at sentencing (R. 64:2). Without 
affording either party the opportunity to speak, Judge Frederick summarily concluded that 
Samora had voluntarily absented himself and sentenced Samora to the maximum one year 
sentence (R. 64:2); see Addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge violated Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process by failing to afford 
the parties an opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing and by otherwise 
failing to base the sentence on relevant information or to conduct a full and fair 
sentencing hearing. Imposing a maximum sentence based solely on the failure to appear 
without considering the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's background or 
society's interests and without affording the parties the opportunity to present information 
relevant to sentencing violates the rule and due process and requires a new sentencing 
hearing. 
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The trial judge further violated due process and the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
by sentencing Appellant in absentia. Appellant did not knowingly waive his right to 
presence at sentencing in this case where he was not informed that he would be sentenced 
even if he were not present. The critical role of presence at sentencing requires that the 
right to presence not be lightly forfeited. In this case where Appellant did not waive his 
right to be present at sentencing, the trial court erred in sentencing him in absentia and the 
sentence must be vacated. 
Just as he did not knowingly waive the right to presence, Samora did not 
knowingly waive his right to appeal. The right to appeal is essential to a fair hearing and 
cannot be easily waived. In this case, nothing in the record demonstrates that Samora was 
informed that if he did not appear at sentencing, he would waive his right to appeal any 
unlawful sentence which was rendered against him. In addition, Samora did not escape 
after an appeal was in place; instead, he did not appear at sentencing. Moreover, it would 
be fundamentally unfair to proceed with sentencing despite the fact that Samora was not 
present, then disallow an appeal of that sentence because Samora was not in custody. 
Finally, the rationale for dismissing appeals when an inmate escapes, while of 
questionable continuing validity, does not apply to this situation because the state is able 
to enforce any ruling on appeal in this case and has proceeded with this case and obtained 
a final judgment despite Samora's absence. In such circumstances, the state has reaped a 
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benefit from Samora's absence, so allowing review of his unlawful sentence is 
appropriate and necessary for the integrity of the system. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA TO THE 
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WITHOUT ANY INPUT 
FROM EITHER PARTY. 
Judge Frederick began the sentencing proceeding by pointing out, "[t]his is another 
case where the defendant apparently is not present.. . ." (R. 64:2). Without affording 
either party an opportunity to speak, Judge Frederick then stated: 
Mr. Samora entered a plea of guilty to a class A misdemeanor crime 
of joyriding with attempt to deprive. He has failed to appear at Adult 
Probation and Parole and/or in this Court, I will determine thereby that he 
has voluntarily absented himself from these proceedings, and will order that 
he be committed under the plea he entered to the Adult Detention Center for 
a period of one year, and order that he be fined an amount of $2500 
(inaudible) [Mr. Defense Counsel]. 
I will order the commitment to issue forthwith, and [Mr. Prosecutor], 
as to findings and conclusions of law, I'll ask you to prepare. 
(R. 64:2). 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 22 WHEN HE SENTENCED SAMORA WITHOUT 
CONSIDERING RELEVANT AND RELIABLE INFORMATION AND 
WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
SPEAK AT SENTENCING. 
The state and federal due process clauses ffrequire[] that a sentencing judge act on 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing sentence." 
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State v. HowelL 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985): see also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071 (state 
and federal due process protections applicable to sentencing require that judge make 
sentencing decision based on reliable and relevant information). A sentence which is not 
based on reliable and relevant information must be vacated. See id. at 1071-75 (vacating 
sentence based on unreliable hearsay report). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) further attempts to effectuate the due process requirement 
of a full and fair sentencing hearing based on relevant and reliable information by 
requiring sentencing judges to give both the defendant and the prosecutor an opportunity 
to present any information which might be material to the sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(a) states in part: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added); see Howell 707 P.2d at 118 (f,[t]o ensure 
fairness in the sentencing procedure, [Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)] directs trial courts to hear 
evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be 
imposed"). 
The plain language of Rule 22(a) places on the trial court the responsibility to 
afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak at sentencing and to present information 
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relevant to sentencing.2 While Rule 22(a) mandates that the trial court give the parties the 
opportunity to speak at sentencing, due process as outlined in Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071 
requires that any sentence imposed by trial judges be based on reliable and relevant 
information. Working together, Rule 22(a) and due process require a trial judge to make 
sure that a fair and full sentencing hearing which meets due process requirements occurs. 
In this case, the trial court did not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the 
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. Failure to hold a full 
sentencing hearing and the concomitant failure to base the sentencing decision on 
complete and accurate information requires a new sentencing hearing pursuant to 
Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071-75. In a case such as the present one where the trial judge did 
not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the opportunity to present information 
pertinent to the sentencing decision, conducting a harmless error review would undermine 
the due process requirement of a full and fair sentencing hearing. Since defense counsel 
was not given the opportunity to present relevant information, complete information 
favorable to the defendant is not in the record. Moreover, the prosecutor may have been 
aware of mitigating circumstances and requested a less severe sentence; that information 
would likewise not be in the record since the prosecutor was not afforded the opportunity 
to speak. Reviewing the record under these circumstances to determine whether the 
2
 Where a defendant is represented by counsel, defendant presents information 
through defense counsel. 
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missing information would have impacted on the sentence would be ludicrous where the 
parties were not afforded the opportunity to include that information in the record. 
Even if this Court were to attempt a review for prejudice, the record in this case 
demonstrates harm caused by the court's failure to afford counsel the opportunity to 
consider information relevant to sentencing. The record demonstrates that the crime in 
this case was part of a domestic dispute which occurred at the end of a three-year live-in 
relationship (R. 63; 21). Although Samora admitted that he took his girlfriend's car 
without her permission, he did not have the intent to permanently deprive her of that 
vehicle and the car was returned to her (R. 21, 03). No violence was involved and Kelly 
Johnson continued to use Samora's cell phone and had some of his property in her 
possession (R. 63:7). Since Judge Frederick was not present at the plea hearing and a 
transcript had not been prepared, he did not know that this crime involved a domestic 
dispute or that the victim had some of Samora's property. Had the judge been fully aware 
of the circumstances, probation, not the maximum sentence, would have been likely. 
Samora's nonappearance at sentencing does not alter the likelihood that he would 
not have received the maximum sentence. First, failing to appear at sentencing is 
punishable by other means and should not enter into the sentencing matrix. For example, 
a defendant who fails to appear at sentencing can be charged with a separate crime or held 
on a bench warrant after not appearing. In addition, if the judge sentences a defendant in 
absentia, the defendant loses the right to allocution which can play an important role in 
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mitigating sentence; see discussion infra at 14-25 regarding impropriety of sentencing in 
absentia. 
Common sense dictates that imposing a maximum sentence based solely on a 
failure to appear at sentencing can result in sentences which are not appropriate in light of 
society's interests, the nature of the crime or the defendant's background, and which 
impact profoundly on criminal justice resources. Filling the jail with misdemeanants 
serving maximum sentences who are irresponsible regarding their court dates but who 
otherwise do not present a threat to society nor deserve severe punishment makes little 
sense. Instead, the sentencing decision is more appropriately based on a complete review 
of the nature of the crime and the background of the defendant. 
Additionally, even if nonappearance at sentencing were considered in determining 
the appropriate sentence, it would be only one of several factors to be considered. 
f,A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of his 
background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which 
underlie the criminal justice system." State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1980). In other words, pursuant to McClendon, Johnson and due process, a sentence must 
be based not only on the circumstances of the crime, but also on other factors such as the 
defendant's background and the interests of society. The crime in this case where Samora 
took his live-in girlfriend's car and had no intent to permanently deprive her of that car 
was relatively benign. Nothing in the record suggests Samora had an extensive criminal 
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history or was involved in violence, and Samora had been employed full-time at the same 
place for a year. Under these circumstances, probation was likely and Samora was 
prejudiced by the judge's failure to conduct a full sentencing hearing. 
As a final matter, even if this issue was not adequately preserved for review by the 
trial judge's ruling, it nevertheless was plain error requiring that the sentence be vacated. 
The error in failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak on behalf of his 
client and in otherwise failing to base the sentencing decision on reliable and relevant 
information was obvious in light of Rule 22(a) and Johnson. See generally Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1208-09 (plain error occurs where error is obvious and prejudices defendant). The 
obviousness of the error in failing to afford counsel the opportunity to present information 
relevant to sentencing is bolstered by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7) (1999) which 
mandates that the trial judge receive any information regarding the appropriate sentence 
which the parties desire to present, and that such information "be presented in open court 
on the record and in the presence of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7) 
(1999). 
While this due process error requires vacation of the sentence regardless of 
whether prejudice is apparent in the record (see discussion supra at 10), even if prejudice 
were required, the record demonstrates that Samora was harmed by the judge's failure to 
conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing. As outlined supra at 11, the error in failing to 
afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing 
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prejudiced Samora since the trial judge was not fully informed of the nature and 
circumstances of the crime or Samora's background. Had the trial judge been fully 
informed and considered all relevant and reliable information, probation would have been 
the appropriate sentence. 
In addition, exceptional circumstances require review of this issue. See Irwin, 924 
P.2d at 11. The irregular procedure which occurred in this case whereby the judge 
sentenced Samora in absentia without affording either party the opportunity to speak is an 
exceptional circumstance which requires review. See discussion supra at 4. Without 
review, the flagrant violation of Samora's right to due process which occurred in this case 
would not be scrutinized nor corrected. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 22 BY SENTENCING SAMORA IN ABSENTIA. 
In addition to failing to comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process in 
conducting the sentencing hearing without affording counsel the opportunity to present 
relevant information, Judge Frederick violated Rule 22, due process and Article I, 
section 12, Utah Constitution by sentencing Samora in absentia. Article I, section 12, 
Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee 
the right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109-10; United States v. 
McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Because the right to presence at 
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sentencing is constitutionally guaranteed, the trial judge may not proceed in absentia 
unless the defendant waives the right to presence. 
1. The Record Does Not Demonstrate a Knowing Waiver of the Right to 
Presence at Sentencing; Samora Was Not Informed That the Sentencing 
Would Occur If He Was Not Present and It Cannot Be Assumed That 
Samora Would Have Known That He Would Be Sentenced in Absentia If 
He Did Not Appear. 
Any waiver of the right to be present at sentencing "must be voluntary and involve 
an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110 (further 
citation omitted). The burden is on the state to establish waiver, and a knowing and 
voluntary waiver may not be presumed by the trial court. State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 
678-79 (Utah 1986). 
In order to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to presence at sentencing, the 
defendant must, at the very least, be given notice of the proceedings. Anderson. 929 P.2d 
at 1110. In addition, the directive given the defendant must provide sufficient warning 
that the hearing will proceed even if the defendant is not present for a knowing waiver of 
the right to presence to occur. McPherson. 421 F.2d at 1129-30. 
In Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1111, the Supreme Court held that sentencing the 
defendant in absentia did not violate the defendant's right to allocution where the 
defendant was informed of the trial date and signed a written waiver of his right to be 
present. Id. at 1110-11. The Court recognized that the right to allocution at sentencing 
"is an inseparable part of the right to be present" found in Article I, section 12, Utah 
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Constitution. Id. at 1111. Anderson waived his right to allocution by his voluntary 
absence after being informed of the trial date, his execution of a written waiver of his 
right to be present, his failure to appear at trial, and his failure to keep in touch with 
counsel or appear at sentencing. Id. at 1110-11. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Anderson is consistent with the McPherson 
approach of requiring that the defendant be informed that the proceeding will be held 
without him in order to have a knowing waiver3, and must be read in light of the facts and 
policy considerations relevant to the circumstances under which Anderson failed to 
appear. Because Anderson was warned of the consequences of failing to appear and had 
signed a written waiver of his right to presence in which he agreed to be tried in absentia, 
requiring that the defendant be warned of the consequences of nonappearance in order to 
find a knowing waiver of the right to presence fits squarely within the Anderson holding. 
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Relying on McPherson, the Anderson court stated, n[t]o 
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the 
proceedings." Id. (citing McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1130). Since the notice required in 
3
 McPherson focused on the nature of the communication with the defendant, i.e. 
on whether the defendant was informed the hearing would proceed in his absence, in 
determining whether the defendant knowingly waived his right to presence. McPherson, 
421 F.2d at 1129-30. In fact, although the trial judge in McPherson made it clear that the 
defendant was to be present at sentencing and that serious consequences would occur if 
he was not, the appellate court concluded that a knowing waiver of the right to presence 
did not occur where the record did not show that the defendant was informed that the trial 
would proceed without him. Id. 
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McPherson was that sentencing would proceed without the defendant if he did not appear, 
this reliance on McPherson in Anderson requires that the defendant be given notice that 
the sentencing will occur even if he does not appear in order to sentence in absentia. 
Requiring that a defendant be informed that sentencing will proceed without him 
for there to be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence is also consistent 
with United States Supreme Court case law interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. See Crosby 
v. United States. 506 U.S. 255, 256, 113 S.Ct. 748, 749, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). In 
Crosby, the Court recognized that it cannot be assumed that a defendant who fails to 
appear knows that a trial will go on without him. In fact, lf'[s]ince the notion that trial 
may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock most lawyers, it would hardly seem 
appropriate to impute knowledge that this will occur to their clients.'" Crosby, 506 U.S. 
at 261 (citation omitted). Moreover, while under the federal rules, a trial may continue to 
conclusion when a defendant disappears after the trial has begun, a trial in absentia is not 
permitted if the defendant fails to appear at the beginning of trial. Id. at 262 (citing 
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973)). In making a distinction between absenting 
oneself mid-trial and not appearing at the beginning of trial for purposes of determining 
whether a defendant waived his right to presence, the Supreme Court recognized that a 
defendant who flees mid-trial knows that the trial has begun and will proceed without him 
whereas a defendant who does not appear at the beginning of trial has no such knowledge. 
Hence, while a knowing waiver of the right to presence occurs when a defendant flees 
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mid-trial, a knowing waiver is not demonstrated when the defendant fails to appear at all 
because the nonappearing defendant has not knowingly waived his right to presence. 
Although Anderson supports the McPherson approach, it also fails to control the 
issue before this Court because it involved circumstances which are different from those 
in the present case. The trial court properly tried Anderson in absentia based on a written 
waiver of the right to presence. In determining whether the subsequent sentencing could 
also be conducted in absentia, the Court looked to cases involving similar circumstances 
where a defendant was properly tried in absentia and had not shown up by the time of 
sentencing. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Because it would create an anomaly to be able 
to try in absentia a defendant who affirmatively waived his right to presence but then be 
unable to sentence him, the Supreme Court held that sentencing Anderson in absentia 
after he had expressly waived his right to presence at trial was appropriate. Id. The 
Anderson court did not consider the current circumstances, however, where a defendant 
who had not been informed at the plea hearing that sentencing would occur without him 
later failed to appear at sentencing. 
Moreover, because presence of the defendant at sentencing is even more critical 
than it is at trial, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be lightly forfeited. See 
United States v. Turner, 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (1982); State v. Fettis, 664 P.2d 208, 209 
(Ariz. 1983). n[T]he common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present 
at his sentencing." Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915; United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 
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955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ('"The requirement that the defendant be present 
when sentence is passed has deep common law origins.'"). Presence is of critical 
importance to sentencing not only because it allows the judge to be presented with all of 
the information needed for a full and fair sentencing, but also because it allows the judge 
to question and admonish the defendant. Indeed, "[i]t is only when the defendant is 
before the court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." Fettis, 664 
P.2d at 209. 
Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other 
rights, such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating 
evidence, and it may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker 
be required to face him. The state may have an interest in the presence of 
the defendant in order that the example of personal admonition might deter 
others from similar crimes. Moreover, it may sometimes be important that 
the convicted man be called to account publicly for what he has done, not to 
be made an instrument of the general deterrent, but to acknowledge 
symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts and to receive 
personally the official expression of society's condemnation for his 
conduct. The ceremonial rendering of judgment may also contribute to the 
individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied by 
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime. 
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915. 
Presence of the defendant at sentencing also preserves the dignity of the 
individuals being sentenced as well as the court and the system itself. 
Respect for the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man 
to be present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce 
whether it will deprive him of liberty. It shows a fundamental lack of 
respect for the dignity of a man to sentence him in absentia. The presence 
of the defendant indicates that society has sufficient confidence in the 
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justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the convicted man 
himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both 
sentence and conviction. 
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The important 
policy considerations relating to presence at sentencing require that the right to presence 
at sentencing not be easily waived. See id. at 915 (important policy considerations 
supporting right to presence at sentencing "militate against a rule allowing presence at 
sentencing to be lightly waived"). 
Because of the critical importance of presence to sentencing, many jurisdictions 
refuse to allow sentencing in absentia except in extraordinary circumstances. Fettis, 664 
P.2d at 209. Such extraordinary circumstances, while "rare indeed" (id.), may include 
circumstances where a defendant has expressly waived his right to be present at 
sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citation omitted). Extraordinary 
circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may also include circumstances where the 
defendant has been fully informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence if he does 
not appear at the sentencing hearing. See Lowery v. State, 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark. 
1988) (court unwilling to find defendant waived the right to presence at sentencing "in the 
absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being sentenced 
prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link, 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (111. App. 
1997) (court requires that defendant must be "warned his failure to appear may result in 
the proceedings continuing in absentia" in order to sentence a defendant in absentia); 
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People v. Bennett. 557 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (court reasons that 
sentencing in absentia was permissible where defendant was fiilly advised that sentencing 
would occur in his absence if he failed to appear); People v. Harris, 564 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (same); People v. Christopher R.. 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1987) (same). These cases support the notion that at the very least, a defendant must be 
informed that the sentencing will occur even if he is not present in order to knowingly 
waive his right to presence. 
While Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) facilitates due process and the Article I, section 12, 
Utah Constitution right to appear and defend by allowing defendant to speak and present 
information relevant to sentencing, Rule 22(b) allows sentencing to proceed even though 
the defendant is not present ,f[o]n the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b). The grounds on which a defendant may 
be tried in his absence are circumstances where the defendant has knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to presence; in the context of sentencing, a knowing waiver 
does not occur unless the defendant has been informed that the sentencing will proceed 
even if he is not present. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2), which recognizes that in order to proceed in absentia at 
trial, the defendant must knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to presence, does not 
affect the determination of whether the constitutional right to presence at sentencing was 
waived. Utah R. Crim P. 17(a)(2) states in part, "[i]n prosecutions for offenses not 
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punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or 
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present." 
While this rule suggests that voluntary absence from trial after notice of the time for trial 
constitutes a knowing waiver of the right to presence at trial, it does not outline what 
constitutes a knowing waiver of the right to presence at sentencing. More importantly, 
even if Rule 17(a)(2) applied to sentencing hearings rather than trial, the Article I, 
section 12 right to presence at sentencing would override the rule. Because of the greater 
importance of presence at sentencing, the fundamental, common law roots in requiring 
presence at sentencing and the lack of awareness by most people that a sentencing will be 
held if the defendant is not present, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be waived 
except in extraordinary circumstances which may include circumstances where the 
defendant was informed that the sentencing would be held even if he did not appear. 
In the present case where Samora was not informed that he would be sentenced 
even if he did not appear at sentencing, Samora did not knowingly waive his right to 
presence at sentencing. The trial judge therefore erred in sentencing Samora in absentia 
and the sentence must be vacated. 
2. The Public Interest Did Not Require That Samora Be Sentenced in 
Absentia. 
In determining whether the right to presence has been waived thereby allowing for 
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sentencing in absentia, a trial court must also weigh whether the public interest in 
proceeding without the defendant outweighs the defendant's interest in being present. 
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (court relies on practical considerations which supported 
proceeding with the sentencing in absentia); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 36 
(2d Cir. 1989) (court considers whether public interest in proceeding with sentencing in 
absentia outweighed defendant's interest in being present in deciding whether to uphold 
sentencing in absentia). 
In Anderson, the Supreme Court upheld the sentencing in absentia after concluding 
thatM [practical considerations . . . mitigate[d] in favor of in absentia sentencing." 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. Anderson had executed a written waiver of his right to be 
present, then left the state. The Court was concerned that Anderson could absent himself 
for years "and the eventual sentencing would have to be performed by a judge who was 
unfamiliar with the case and had no access to relevant information." Id. 
Concerns about dilatory defendants who attempt to delay the administration of 
justice by failing to appear at sentencing are remedied by requiring trial judges to exercise 
their discretion to proceed in absentia by balancing "the public interest in proceeding 
[without the defendant]" against the defendant's interest in being present. Smith v. Mann, 
173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S.Ct. 200; see also Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 
36-37; People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 131, 137 (N.Y. 1982). Requiring that trial courts 
balance the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present 
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ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to presence. Fontanez. 878 F.2d 
at 36. 
The factors to be considered when balancing the public interest in proceeding in 
absentia against the defendant's interest in being present include whether there is a 
possibility that the defendant could be contacted and brought to court within a reasonable 
amount of time, the difficulty in rescheduling the sentencing hearing, the burden on the 
state in not proceeding, and whether there is a possibility that information relevant to 
sentencing will be lost. See Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1317; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 36; 
Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1111. 
In this case, Judge Frederick erred in sentencing Samora in absentia where the 
judge did not balance the public interest in proceeding against Samora's interest in being 
present, and the record fails to demonstrate that the public interest required that Samora 
be sentenced in absentia. Continuing the sentencing hearing to another date would not 
have been difficult; sentencing hearings take a relatively short amount of time and are 
often rescheduled. The state would not have been burdened by a continuance since it 
presented no information pertinent to sentencing; the state could have easily done the 
same thing if the sentencing had been rescheduled, and there was no threat that 
information relevant to sentencing would be lost if sentencing were rescheduled. Since 
Judge Frederick had taken the case from another judge, was not present when the plea 
was taken and had no specific knowledge that would be lost,, the public had no interest in 
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maintaining him as the judge; even if a delay in sentencing caused reassignment of the 
case, information pertinent to sentencing would not be lost and the effective 
administration of justice would not be undermined since Judge Frederick did not sit 
through the trial as the Anderson judge had, and did not take the plea. 
Samora's fundamental, critical interest in being present for sentencing was not 
outweighed by the public interest in proceeding. The trial judge therefore erred in 
sentencing Samora in absentia and the sentence must be vacated. 
POINT II. SAMORA'S ABSENCE FROM SENTENCING DOES NOT 
REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF HIS APPEAL.4 
Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to appeal a 
criminal conviction. That right is "essential to a fair criminal proceeding" and cannot be 
lightly forfeited. State v. Tuttle. 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). Just as Samora did not 
4
 The state argued in its response to this Court's sua sponte motion for summary 
disposition that Samora was not entitled to pursue this appeal because he is a fugitive. 
After both parties filed responses to the motion for summary disposition, this Court 
withdrew the motion but ordered the parties to address all issues raised in the responses. 
Samora therefore addresses this issue in his opening brief. 
The record in this case demonstrates only that Samora failed to appear at 
sentencing and a bench warrant was issued. The state's claim that Samora remains a 
fugitive therefore does not have record support. 
While Samora maintains that this Court should not review the state's claim that 
Samora is a fugitive, as a matter of candor to the Court, however, counsel acknowledges 
that as of the day this brief is filed, Manuel Samora does not appear on the jail roster for 
Salt Lake County. Counsel has not checked the jail rosters for other counties throughout 
the state nor other states to determine whether Samora is being held elsewhere. Nor has 
counsel checked the Salt Lake County jail roster throughout this appeal to determine 
whether Samora has served time during the course of appeal and released on an ankle 
monitor or by other means. 
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knowingly waive his right to presence by not appearing at sentencing, he did not 
knowingly or intentionally waive his right to appeal. In fact, the record does not 
demonstrate that Samora was informed of his right to appeal his sentence or that if he did 
not appear at sentencing, he would be sentenced in absentia and forfeit his right to appeal. 
In Turtle, the Court held that "[i]n light of the fundamental nature of the right to 
appellate review of a criminal conviction and the lack of any sound practical or policy 
justification for refusing to hear the appeals of escapees after they are returned to custody, 
we conclude that a criminal appeal dismissed after escape may be reinstated unless the 
State can show that it has been prejudiced by the defendant's absence and consequent 
lapse of time." Id. at 705. The rationale for allowing reinstatement of the appeal was that 
"an escape cannot [] be said to be a knowing waiver of appeal rights . . . . " Id. at 704. In 
fact, the Turtle Court overruled State v. Brady, 655 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1982), which had 
held that an appeal could not be reinstated after escape, because Brady was based on the 
incorrect determination that one who escapes intentionally and knowingly abandons his 
appeal rights. Id. Hence, Turtle directs that the focus is on whether the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his appeal rights when he absconded, and clearly 
indicates that escape does not constitute a knowing and intentional waiver of the right to 
appeal. 
While Turtle did not directly overrule Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 
1981), which held that an appeal could be dismissed when a defendant escapes, it does 
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call the holding of Hardy into question. The recognition in Tuttle of the importance of 
the right to appeal, and the further recognition that escape does not constitute a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of that right, suggest that an appeal should not be dismissed simply 
because the defendant is not in custody. In light of Tuttle, the Court in Hardy focused on 
an incorrect rationale when it determined that a defendant's escape "disentitles" him to 
appeal his conviction. Hardy, 636 P.2d at 474.5 Instead, the focus should be on whether 
a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal when he absconded; 
Tuttle tells us that he did not. 
In addition, even if Hardy still allowed for dismissal of an appeal when a 
defendant escapes, it would not require dismissal in this case. The holding in Hardy was 
based on a determination that because the defendant had escaped and placed himself 
5
 The Hardy rationale that the state would not be able to enforce a judgment on 
appeal so it would not be fair to allow the defendant to proceed and possibly reap the 
benefit of a favorable ruling on appeal is of questionable validity. If the state were to win 
on appeal, it could enforce a favorable ruling just as it could and did without the appeal. 
Hardy, who had escaped, was eventually picked up and returned to custody. If the appeal 
had gone forward and the conviction affirmed, the judgment holding Hardy would have 
been final. Instead, the state enforced the conviction and judgment from the trial court. 
In other words, when a defendant is convicted and appeals, and the state prevails on 
appeal, nothing is left to do with the case except enforce the decision by continuing to 
hold the defendant. Hence, there is no unfairness to the state by proceeding with the 
appeal. By contrast, however, there is unfairness to the defendant who loses this 
fundamental right to appeal even though he has not knowingly and intentionally waived 
it. The efficient administration of the justice system is better served by allowing appeals 
to go forward regardless of whether the defendant has absconded. In addition, fairness 
and due process require that convictions or sentences which are in violation of the law or 
are fundamentally unfair be reviewed unless the defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
waived the right to appellate review. 
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outside the control of the judicial system, it would not be fair to allow him to ask the 
court to consider his case because fKthe escaped prisoner should not be able to reap the 
benefit of a decision in his favor when the state could not enforce a decision in its favor.'" 
Hardy. 636 P.2d at 474 (citation omitted). 
In this case, Samora has not escaped. While Hardy had an appeal in place, then 
chose to leave, Samora simply did not appear at sentencing. The state then reaped the 
benefit of sentencing Samora in absentia. It can enforce that sentence; a bench warrant is 
in place and Samora will be required to serve a year in jail when he is arrested. Hence, 
the unfairness of allowing the defendant to proceed when the state cannot enforce a 
favorable appeal does not exist in this case. Indeed, it would be fundamentally unfair to 
not allow review of the procedure utilized in this case where the decision has already 
been made to proceed in Samora's absence, the state has reaped the benefit of obtaining a 
maximum sentence, and Samora has lost the benefit of his right to presence, his right to 
present information relevant to sentencing, and his right to a full and fair sentencing 
hearing. In other words, the state has proceeded in this case despite the defendant's 
absence and benefitted from that absence; to not allow Samora to challenge the propriety 
of the process used against him would be fundamentally unfair. 
This Court's decision in State v. Mova, 815 P.2d 1312 (Utah App. 1991) likewise 
supports a review of Samora's claims on appeal. In Moya, this Court decided the merits 
of Appellant's claims despite the fact that he was "a fugitive from the criminal justice 
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system." Id. at 1318 (Bench, J., dissenting). Although one of the judges dissented 
because of Moya's fugitive status, indicating that the appeal should be dismissed, the 
majority nevertheless kept the appeal in place and reached Moya's claims. Because the 
issue of whether to dismiss the appeal was obviously considered in light of the dissent, 
the fact that the majority did not dismiss the appeal suggests that the Court proceeded 
because (1) review was required to protect the fundamental right to appeal, (2) Moya's 
fugitive status did not establish that he knowingly waived his right to appeal, and (3) the 
issues raised in the appeal went to the heart of whether the sentence was legal, making the 
appeal essential to a fair proceeding regardless of whether the defendant was in custody. 
The circumstances in Moya which precluded dismissal of the appeal also exist in 
this case. The right to appeal is essential to a fair proceeding in this case where the trial 
judge proceeded with sentencing in Samora's absence without input from the parties. 
Samora was not informed that sentencing would proceed without him if he did not 
appear, and had no way of knowing that by not appearing, he would also waive his right 
to appeal any sentence imposed when he did not appear. The legality of the procedure 
utilized in sentencing Samora in absentia is at the heart of this appeal. It would be 
fundamentally unfair to not review that procedure because Samora continues to not be in 
contact with the court. 
If this Court were to dismiss this appeal, it would create the ultimate unfair 
paradox: a trial court could go ahead and sentence a defendant even though the defendant 
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was not present, but the defendant could do nothing to pursue any subsequent proceedings 
to ensure that the sentencing was lawful because he did not appear. In other words, the 
absence from proceedings would affect the ability to go forward only when proceeding 
might benefit the defendant. A judge could impose an illegal sentence on an absent 
defendant without any ramifications. Such an approach would severely undermine the 
integrity of the system. 
Moreover, because appeals often take more than a year, if Samora's appeal is put 
on hold, he will receive little or no practical benefit from a positive result because the 
sentence would not be vacated until he had served all or most of this term. This, too, 
would undermine the integrity of the system by allowing courts to impose and carry out 
illegal sentences without review until after the defendant has been required to serve the 
sentence. The fundamental nature of the right to appeal and fairness require that this 
Court review at this point the legality of the procedure utilized by the trial court in 
sentencing Samora. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Manuel Samora respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his sentence and remand his case for a full and fair sentencing hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &U day of January, 2001. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOHN K. WEST 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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1
 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on September 22, 2000) 
3 THE COURT: We'll go now to Manuel Ernesto Samora. 
4 This is case No. CR 006887. Mr. West, you're appearing on 
5 behalf of Mr. Samora. This is another case where the defendant 
6 is apparently not present (inaudible) in custody. A warrant 
7 has previously been issued for his arrest. 
8 Mr. Samora entered a plea of guilty to a class A 
9 misdemeanor crime of joy riding with attempt to deprive. He 
10 has failed to appear at Adult Probation and Parole and/or in 
11 this Court, I will determine thereby that he has voluntarily 
12 absented himself from these proceedings, and will order that he 
13 be committed under the plea he entered to the Adult Detention 
14 Center for a period of one year, and order that he be fined an 
15 amount of $2500 (inaudible) Mr. West. 
16 I will order the commitment to issue forthwith, and 
17 Mr. Murphy, as to the findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
18 I'll ask you to prepare. 
19 MR. MURPHY: Very well, your Honor. 
20 (Hearing concluded) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed 
under my direction from the electronic tape recording 
made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true, and correct 
and contains all of the evidence, all of the 
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all 
matters to which the same relate which were audible 
through said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the 
speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 27th day of 
October 2000. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2004 
NOTARY PUBTTTT 
_^ 
res iding in Utah County 
BEVERLY A. LOWE 
HOmPUBUC-STAIEotUT/IH 
'771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVE 
PROVO.UT 84606 
COMM. EXP 2-24-2004 
ADDENDUM C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Kevin Murphy, 5768 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER SENTENCING 
DEFENDANT IN ABSENTIA 
Case No. 001906887 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This case was called for sentencing on September 22, 2000. The State was represented 
by Kevin Murphy of the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office; defense counsel John West was 
present. However, defendant did not appear. The court enters the following— 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court record reflects, and the Court finds, that defendant had written and oral notice 
of the September 22, 2000, 8:30 AM sentencing hearing. 
2. The Court finds that defendant has voluntarily absented himself from the sentencing 
hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to Utah Rules Criminal Procedure 22(b), it is appropriate that the defendant be 
sentenced in absentia. 
Third Judicial District 
OCT I 0 2000 
ORDERS 
1. Based upon his conviction for Attempted Forgery, a class A misdemeanor, the defendant 
is sentenced to a term of one year in the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center. 
2. The defendant is sentenced to pay a fine of $2500.00. 
3. A no-bail warrant is issued for the defendant's arrest. 
4. Defendant's one year jail commitment shall commence upon his arrest and booking into 
the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center on the warrant. 
& 
DATED this #h i  / / / d a y of SeptFmber, 2000. 
BY THEACOURT 
j . DE^NIS F: 
District Co 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER SENTENCING DEFENDANT IN ABSENTIA was 
delivered to John K. West, Attorney for Defendant Manuel Ernesto Samora at 424 East 500 
South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the day of September, 2000. 
ADDENDUM D 
*' FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
DEC 0 5 2000 
PautetteStagg 
Cleric of the Court 
'THE! UTAH "i U'iJRr; ^ p APPEALS 
- • ooOCw 
State of Utah, 
Pla i nf i f; i • IIV, I nppeiiee, 
v. 
Manuel Ernesto Samor-
DfP.fendaiii aita Appellant 
ORDER 
Case No. 20000884-CA 
This matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion 
for summary affirmance pursuant to Pulp 10 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
I T I S H E R E B Y ORDERED that the sua sponte motion is 
withdrawn, and a ruling on the issues raised therein, as well as 
the additional issues raised in the parties' responses, is 
deferred pursuant to Rule 10(f), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, pending plenary presentation and consideration of the 
appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State's request for a stay of 
briefing is denied, and appellant's opening brief shall be fi led 
on or before January 1 5, 2 001. 
Dated this v5y%^ day ol December, 2000 
FOR THE COURT: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on December 5, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
JOHN K. WEST 
JOAN C. WATT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
Dated this December 5, 2000. 
By HJr^Lcty}ftLyU& ) 
Deputy ClerlO *S 
Case No. 20000884-CA 
ADDENDUM E 
CONSTITUTION < I! TEh II NIXED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process j2qUai 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec, J [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article 
UTAH RULES OF CMMMAJ, III*)('FIJI IKK 
Rule < lie trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may con-
sent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for ofFenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
la> Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
ic) Upon a verdict or plea oi guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec* 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
